Weakness of Will

Radoilska, Lubomira V. (2015) Weakness of Will. Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy, . (doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0111) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0111

Abstract

Weakness of will, or akrasia, is an exciting issue at the heart of moral psychology and the philosophy of mind and action. This articleoffers a problem-centered guide to the relevant literature in contemporary analytic philosophy with reference to the main classical texts. The topics covered include: contemporary versus classical conceptions of akrasia, the possibility of weakness of will and its significance within instrumental and substantive theories of practical rationality, the nature of akratic actions and akratic attitudes, and the plausibility of a theoretical counterpart of weakness of will, such as epistemic akrasia.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
R Medicine > RC Internal medicine > RC0321 Neuroscience. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Lubomira Radoilska
Date Deposited: 11 Jun 2015 11:37 UTC
Last Modified: 25 Nov 2015 09:52 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/49009 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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