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Manifestability and Epistemic Truth

Murzi, Julien (2012) Manifestability and Epistemic Truth. Topoi, 31 (1). pp. 17-26. ISSN 0167-7411. (doi:10.1007/s11245-011-9106-7) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:48954)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-011-9106-7

Abstract

I argue that the standard anti-realist argument from manifestability to intuitionistic logic is either unsound or invalid. Strong interpretations of the manifestability of understanding are falsified by the existence of blindspots for knowledge. Weaker interpretations are either too weak, or gerrymandered and ad hoc. Either way, they present no threat to classical logic.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s11245-011-9106-7
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Fiona Symes
Date Deposited: 08 Jun 2015 15:08 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 14:41 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/48954 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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