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Epistemic Consequentialism

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer and Dunn, Jeffrey, eds. (2018) Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 336 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-877968-1. (doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:48611)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.00...

Abstract

An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent in virtue of the fact that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the familiar family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to—and so face similar problems to—versions of rule consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.

Item Type: Edited book
DOI/Identification number: 10.1093/oso/9780198779681.001.0001
Uncontrolled keywords: epistemic normativity, consequentialism, epistemic value, epistemic utility, reliabilism, formal epistemology, accuracy, rationality
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 22 May 2015 14:28 UTC
Last Modified: 26 Feb 2021 11:50 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/48611 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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