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Williamson, Jon (2015) DELIBERATION, JUDGEMENT AND THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE. Economics and Philosophy, 31 (1). pp. 27-65. ISSN 0266-2671. (doi:10.1017/S026626711400039X) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:47312)

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A normative Bayesian theory of deliberation and judgement requires a procedure for merging the evidence of a collection of agents. In order to provide such a procedure, one needs to ask what the evidence is that grounds Bayesian probabilities. After finding fault with several views on the nature of evidence (the views that evidence is knowledge; that evidence is whatever is fully believed; that evidence is observationally set credence; that evidence is information), it is argued that evidence is whatever is rationally taken for granted. This view is shown to have consequences for an account of merging evidence, and it is argued that standard axioms for merging need to be altered somewhat.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1017/S026626711400039X
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > Q Science (General) > Q335 Artificial intelligence
Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA273 Probabilities
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 23 Feb 2015 11:36 UTC
Last Modified: 17 Aug 2022 10:58 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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