Strategic delay and information cascades

Cartwright, Edward (2015) Strategic delay and information cascades. Journal of Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie, 114 (1). pp. 63-74. ISSN 0931-8658. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-014-0393-5) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

In a setting where agents must choose between two investments, Zhang (in RAND J Econ 28:188–205, 1997) proposed an equilibrium in which there is strategic delay. This equilibrium relied upon there being an information cascade. We shall demonstrate that an information cascade need not generally occur. It will only occur if and only if the cost of investing takes relatively extreme values. Taking this into account we derive a revised equilibrium that is still characterized by strategic delay.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2015 07:27 UTC
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2015 07:27 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/46977 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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