Cartwright, Edward (2015) Strategic delay and information cascades. Journal of Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie, 114 (1). pp. 63-74. ISSN 0931-8658. (doi:10.1007/s00712-014-0393-5) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:46977)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00712-... |
Abstract
In a setting where agents must choose between two investments, Zhang (in RAND J Econ 28:188–205, 1997) proposed an equilibrium in which there is strategic delay. This equilibrium relied upon there being an information cascade. We shall demonstrate that an information cascade need not generally occur. It will only occur if and only if the cost of investing takes relatively extreme values. Taking this into account we derive a revised equilibrium that is still characterized by strategic delay.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s00712-014-0393-5 |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Edward Cartwright |
Date Deposited: | 30 Jan 2015 07:27 UTC |
Last Modified: | 17 Aug 2022 10:58 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/46977 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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