Conditional cooperation and the marginal per-capita return in public good games

Cartwright, Edward and Lovett, Denise (2014) Conditional cooperation and the marginal per-capita return in public good games. Games, 5 (4). pp. 234-256. ISSN 2073-4336. (doi:https://doi.org/10.3390/g5040234) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/4/234

Abstract

We investigate experimentally whether the extent of conditional cooperation in public good games depends on the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to the public good and type of game. The MPCR is varied from 0.2 to 0.4 to 0.8. The ‘standard’ game, in which three players contribute before a follower, is compared with a leader-follower game, in which one player leads and three follow. Even though we observe less conditional cooperation for an MPCR of 0.2, the prevalence of conditional cooperation remains relatively stable to changes in the MPCR and game timing. In contrast, the level of MPCR has a strong effect on unconditional contributions. Our results highlight the critical role played by leaders in a public good game.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 30 Jan 2015 07:22 UTC
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2015 07:22 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/46976 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):