Leveraging Effective Provision of International Public Goods: A Limit On Hegemonic Leadership.

Grundig, Frank, Ward, Hugh (2011) Leveraging Effective Provision of International Public Goods: A Limit On Hegemonic Leadership. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

It is often impossible or irrational for the hegemon directly to provide international public goods itself. However, it can still influence supply by using its leverage, bribing or threatening other states to contribute. Often supply will not increase unless some essential group of states all contribute. This makes it easy for another major power that wants a lower level of provision than the hegemon to block the hegemon’s influence attempts: if it cannot veto or does not wish to use its veto, it only needs to exert countervailing power to ensure that one essential state blocks action; whereas the hegemon must get all essential states on side. By formalizing this idea as a spatial veto game with sidepayments we are able to show that the hegemon must have considerable predominance over the major power if provision is to be higher than the major power wants, depending on the number of essential states and the disposition of preferences. Using data on international environmental problems, we find support for our hypothesis.

Item Type: Conference or workshop item (Paper)
Subjects: J Political Science
J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations > Conflict Analysis Research Centre
Depositing User: Frank Grundig
Date Deposited: 21 Nov 2014 01:14 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 13:32 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/44662 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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