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Leveraging Effective Provision of International Public Goods: A Limit On Hegemonic Leadership.

Grundig, Frank, Ward, Hugh (2011) Leveraging Effective Provision of International Public Goods: A Limit On Hegemonic Leadership. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:44662)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

It is often impossible or irrational for the hegemon directly to provide international

bribing or threatening other states to contribute. Often supply will not increase unless

power that wants a lower level of provision than the hegemon to block the hegemon’s

exert countervailing power to ensure that one essential state blocks action; whereas

veto game with sidepayments we are able to show that the hegemon must have

major power wants, depending on the number of essential states and the disposition of

our hypothesis.

Item Type: Conference or workshop item (Paper)
Subjects: J Political Science
J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations > Conflict Analysis Research Centre
Depositing User: Frank Grundig
Date Deposited: 21 Nov 2014 01:14 UTC
Last Modified: 10 Dec 2019 04:06 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/44662 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Grundig, Frank: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8166-1887
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