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Innatism and the Stoa

Scott, Dominic (1988) Innatism and the Stoa. Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 34 . pp. 123-153. ISSN 0068-6735. (doi:10.1017/S0068673500005095) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:44602)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0068673500005095

Abstract

Our disagreements concern points of some importance. There is the question whether the soul in itself is blank like a writing tablet on which nothing has as yet been written – a tabula rasa – as Aristotle and the author of the Essay maintain, and whether everything which is inscribed there comes solely from the senses and experience; or whether the soul inherently contains the sources of various notions and doctrines which external objects merely rouse up on suitable occasions, as I believe and as do Plato and even the Schoolmen, and those who understand in this sense the passage in Saint Paul where he says that God's law is written in our hearts (Rom. 2:15). The Stoics call these sources Prolepses, that is fundamental assumptions or things taken for granted in advance.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1017/S0068673500005095
Additional information: Reprinted in 'Classical Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy', ed. T. H. Irwin (Garland Series, Taylor and Francis 1995) pp. 93-124 [see separate entry in KAR].
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Fiona Symes
Date Deposited: 14 Nov 2014 15:13 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 13:31 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/44602 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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