Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will

Radoilska, Lubomira V. (2012) Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will. Tópicos, 43 . pp. 25-50. ISSN 0188-6649. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle’s work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton’s account is after, referred to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’, is best understood as an unsuccessful aĴempt to tackle akrasia and, more specifically, a secondary failure of intentional agency.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Aristotle, blameworthiness, intentional agency, inverse akrasia, motivation, practical syllogism, reasons for action, planning, value, weakness of will.
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Lubomira Radoilska
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2014 14:03 UTC
Last Modified: 25 Nov 2015 09:49 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/44279 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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