Frege's Definition of Number: No Ontological Agenda?

Kanterian, Edward (2010) Frege's Definition of Number: No Ontological Agenda? Hungarian Philosophical Review, 54 (4). pp. 76-92. ISSN 1588-1024. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Abstract

Joan Weiner (2007) has argued that Frege’s definitions of numbers constitute linguistic stipulations that carry no ontological commitment: they don’t present numbers as pre-existing objects. This paper offers a critical discussion of this view, showing that it is vitiated by serious exegetical errors and that it saddles Frege’s project with insuperable substantive difficulties. It is first demonstrated that Weiner misrepresents the Fregean notions of so-called Foundations-content, and of sense, reference, and truth. The discussion then focuses on the role of definitions in Frege’s work, demonstrating that they cannot be understood as mere linguistic stipulations, since they have an ontological aim. The paper concludes with stressing both the epistemological and the ontological aspects of Frege’s project, and their crucial interdependence.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: N.G. Isaeva
Date Deposited: 15 Aug 2014 14:10 UTC
Last Modified: 08 Jun 2015 08:41 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/42337 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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