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A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer, Dunn, Jeffrey (2014) A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism. Philosophical Quarterly, 64 (257). pp. 541-551. ISSN 1467-9213. (doi:10.1093/pq/pqu034) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqu034

Abstract

Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker’s main targets—survives Berker’s arguments unscathed.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1093/pq/pqu034
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: K. Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 04 Jul 2014 09:49 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 12:45 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/41691 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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