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Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2014) Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference. Episteme, 11 (4). pp. 423-442. ISSN 1742-3600. E-ISSN 1750-0117. (doi:10.1017/epi.2014.20) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2014.20

Abstract

It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1017/epi.2014.20
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: K. Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 04 Jul 2014 09:41 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 12:45 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/41690 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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