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There Is More to a Paradox Than Credence

Darby, George, Landes, Jürgen (2014) There Is More to a Paradox Than Credence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 3 (2). pp. 98-109. ISSN 2161-2234. (doi:10.1002/tht3.117) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:41063)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.117

Abstract

Besides the usual business of solving paradoxes, there has been recent philosophical work on their essential nature. Lycan characterises a paradox as “an inconsistent set of propositions, each of which is very plausible.” Building on this definition, Paseau offers a numerical measure of paradoxicality of a set of principles: a function of the degrees to which a subject believes the principles considered individually (all typically high) and of the degree to which the subject believes the principles considered together (typically low). We argue (a) that Paseau's measure fails to score certain paradoxes properly and (b) that this failure is not due to the particular measure but rather that any such function just of credences fails to adequately capture paradoxicality. Our analysis leads us to conclude that Lycan's definition also fails to capture the notion of paradox.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1002/tht3.117
Uncontrolled keywords: paradox; measure; credence
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Juergen Landes
Date Deposited: 12 May 2014 12:53 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 12:35 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/41063 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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