II—Simon Kirchin: Evaluation, Normativity and Grounding

Kirchin, Simon T. (2013) II—Simon Kirchin: Evaluation, Normativity and Grounding. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 87 (1). pp. 179-198. ISSN 0309-7013. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00225.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2013.00225.x

Abstract

I consider the ‘normative relevance’ argument and the idea of grounding. I diagnose why there appears to be a tension between the conclusion that we are tempted to reach and the intuition that the normative is grounded in or by the non-normative. Much of what I say turns on the idea of the normative itself. In short, I think that concentrating on this idea can help us see how the tension arises. My aim is to encourage people to reconceptualize the debate so as to begin to offer additional insight. To that end, I spend some time contrasting normativity with evaluation, and then think how the debate may alter if we run it with the latter. I doubt that doing so will solve any problem, and I suspect that what I say will be controversial anyway. But there is some value to changing matters nonetheless. The idea that runs through this paper is that the whole issue is so complex and deep that we should not narrowly construe it with reference only to normativity.

Item Type: Article
Additional information: number of additional authors: 0;
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Stewart Brownrigg
Date Deposited: 07 Mar 2014 00:05 UTC
Last Modified: 20 Apr 2016 15:28 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/40754 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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