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R&D with Spillovers: Monopoly Versus Noncooperative and Cooperative Duopoly

Stepanova, Anna, Tesoriere, Antonio (2011) R&D with Spillovers: Monopoly Versus Noncooperative and Cooperative Duopoly. Manchester School, 79 (1). pp. 125-144. ISSN 1463-6786. E-ISSN 1467-9957. (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02185.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:40222)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02185.x

Abstract

This paper compares industry profit and R&D propensity for a duopoly conducting either noncooperative or cooperative R&D and a monopoly, using two different basic models of strategic R&D. One postulates spillovers in R&D inputs and predicts that equilibrium joint profit and R&D levels are always larger under monopoly. The other postulates spillovers in R&D outputs and sometimes predicts that joint profit and R&D levels are larger under either of the alternative scenarios. In addition, unlike input spillovers, spillovers in R&D outputs sometimes exert a positive effect on both effective and private noncooperative R&D levels.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02185.x
Additional information: Special Issue: Product/Process Innovation and Market Structure
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Stewart Brownrigg
Date Deposited: 07 Mar 2014 00:05 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:37 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/40222 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Stepanova, Anna: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1965-842X
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