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What is Called Thinking? When Deleuze Walks Along Heideggerian Paths

Dillet, Benoît (2013) What is Called Thinking? When Deleuze Walks Along Heideggerian Paths. Deleuze Studies, 7 (2). pp. 250-274. ISSN 1750-2241. (doi:10.3366/dls.2013.0105) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/dls.2013.0105

Abstract

When on the last page of What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1995: 218) claim that philosophy needs a non-philosophy, this statement is the result of a long engagement with the problem of thinking in society. It is this engagement that we intend to reconstruct in this article. By developing an original definition of thinking after Heidegger, Deleuze is able to claim that philosophy is not the only ‘thinking’ discipline. Our point of departure is Deleuze's constant reference to a phrase from Heidegger's lecture course What Is Called Thinking?: ‘We are not yet thinking’ (Deleuze 1988: 116, 1989: 167, 1994: 144, 2002: 108; Deleuze and Guattari 1995: 56). This phrase points to the demand for a new distribution of the relation between philosophy and its outside. The purpose of this article is to trace Heidegger's influence on Deleuze's definition of thinking and to raise two points. First, Deleuze borrows some elements of Heidegger's definition of thinking to further his own understanding of politics as an involuntary practice. For both, the question of thinking is political. Second, by departing from Heidegger, Deleuze can democratise the definition of thinking, beyond its confinement to philosophy, by turning to cinema. Deleuze calls cinema the art of the masses because it brings the masses in contact with external signs. Finally, in the last part of this article, we will discuss how Deleuze raises stupidity (and not error) as a transcendental problem that should be constantly fought. In this way, we hope to shed light on how Deleuze moves from Heidegger's question ‘what is called thinking?’ to the problem of stupidity and shame.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.3366/dls.2013.0105
Uncontrolled keywords: Heidegger, involuntary, thinking, politics, cinema, stupidity
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
J Political Science
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: B.J.P. Dillet
Date Deposited: 08 Apr 2014 15:03 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 12:04 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/39093 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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