How can Causal explanations Explain?

Williamson, Jon (2013) How can Causal explanations Explain? Erkenntnis, 78 (2). pp. 257-275. ISSN 0165-0106. E-ISSN 1572-8420. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9512-x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9512-x

Abstract

The mechanistic and causal accounts of explanation are often conflated to yield a `causal-mechanical' account. This paper prizes them apart and asks: if the mechanistic account is correct, how can causal explanations be explanatory? The answer to this question varies according to how causality itself is understood. It is argued that difference-making, mechanistic, dualist and inferentialist accounts of causality all struggle to yield explanatory causal explanations, but that an epistemic account of causality is more promising in this regard.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 05 Feb 2014 14:51 UTC
Last Modified: 18 May 2015 10:01 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/38169 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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