Social norms and individual savings in the context of informal insurance

Wahhaj, Zaki (2010) Social norms and individual savings in the context of informal insurance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 76 (3). pp. 511-530. ISSN 0167-2681. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.012) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.012

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of informal insurance in the presence of an intertemporal technology. It is shown that when an insurance agreement suffers from enforcement problems, constraints on individual savings behaviour can enable the group to sustain greater cooperation. This result provides a motivation for a variety of social norms observed in traditional societies which discourage ‘excessive’ accumulation of wealth by individuals. The paper also shows that social norms that discourage savings are more likely to benefit poorer communities and thus, paradoxically, cause them to fall further behind even as it serves a useful purpose.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Informal insurance; Social norms; Savings behaviour; Culture and economic development
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Zaki Wahhaj
Date Deposited: 29 Nov 2013 16:37 UTC
Last Modified: 14 Mar 2014 13:45 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/37006 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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