Wahhaj, Zaki (2010) Social norms and individual savings in the context of informal insurance. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 76 (3). pp. 511-530. ISSN 0167-2681. (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.012) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:37006)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.012 |
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of informal insurance in the presence of an intertemporal technology. It is shown that when an insurance agreement suffers from enforcement problems, constraints on individual savings behaviour can enable the group to sustain greater cooperation. This result provides a motivation for a variety of social norms observed in traditional societies which discourage ‘excessive’ accumulation of wealth by individuals. The paper also shows that social norms that discourage savings are more likely to benefit poorer communities and thus, paradoxically, cause them to fall further behind even as it serves a useful purpose.
Item Type: | Article |
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DOI/Identification number: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.08.012 |
Uncontrolled keywords: | Informal insurance; Social norms; Savings behaviour; Culture and economic development |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics |
Depositing User: | Zaki Wahhaj |
Date Deposited: | 29 Nov 2013 16:37 UTC |
Last Modified: | 16 Nov 2021 10:13 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/37006 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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