Skip to main content

Endogenous Leadership in a Coordination Game with Conflict of Interest and Asymmetric Information

Cartwright, Edward and Gillet, Joris and Van Vugt, Mark (2009) Endogenous Leadership in a Coordination Game with Conflict of Interest and Asymmetric Information. UNSPECIFIED. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:36998)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
ftp://ftp.ukc.ac.uk/pub/ejr/RePEc/ukc/ukcedp/0913....

Abstract

We analyze a coordination game characterised by varying degrees of conflict of interest, incentive to coordinate and information asymmetry. The primary objective is to question whether endogenous leadership better enables coordination. A secondary objective is to question whether preference and information asymmetries cue who should lead. Both experimental and theoretical results are provided. We find that in theory leadership should allow coordination, whether or not preferences are common knowledge. In practice we found that leadership did enable coordination but information about others preferences also helped. This was explained as due to some participants being too eager to lead. Which may be surprising given that we find, both in theory and in practice, leaders get relatively low payoffs, particularly when preferences are private information.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
Uncontrolled keywords: Coordination game, Conflict of interest, leadership
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 28 Nov 2013 16:09 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:36 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36998 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
  • Depositors only (login required):