Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity

Patel, Amrish and Cartwright, Edward and Van Vugt, Mark (2010) Punishment Cannot Sustain Cooperation in a Public Good Game with Free-Rider Anonymity. Working paper. GUPEA (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://hdl.handle.net/2077/22373

Abstract

Individuals often have legitimate but publicly unobservable reasons for not partaking in cooperative social endeavours. This means others who lack legitimate reasons may then have the opportunity to behave uncooperatively, i.e. free-ride, and be indistinguishable from those with legitimate reasons. Free-riders have a degree of anonymity. In the context of a public good game we consider the effect of free-rider anonymity on the ability of voluntary punishment to sustain cooperative social norms. Despite only inducing a weak form of free-rider anonymity, punishment falls and cannot sustain cooperation.

Item Type: Monograph (Working paper)
Uncontrolled keywords: Anonymity; free-riding; public goods experiment; punishment
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 28 Nov 2013 08:17 UTC
Last Modified: 13 Jun 2017 08:57 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36966 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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