Does the Endowment of Contributors Make a Difference in Threshold Public Games?

Alberti, Federica and Cartwright, Edward (2015) Does the Endowment of Contributors Make a Difference in Threshold Public Games? Finanz Archiv, 71 (2). pp. 216-239. ISSN 0015-2218. E-ISSN 1614-0974. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1628/001522115X14180267843207) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
https://doi.org/10.1628/001522115X14180267843207

Abstract

We investigate experimentally whether the endowment of potential contributors changes outcomes in threshold public good games. We find that the variance in contributions is significantly reduced for low and high levels of endowment when compared to an intermediate level of endowment. This difference emerges with experience. Evidence on whether the level of endowment influences the success rate at providing public goods is more mixed. We provide, however, a measure of endowment size that correlates with success rate. Our interpretation suggests that people find it hardest to coordinate on the provision of threshold public goods when endowments are of intermediate size. By intermediate we mean that the endowment is small enough that people need to contribute relatively a lot to fund the good, but also large enough that no one person is critical in providing the good.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 28 Nov 2013 08:09 UTC
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2017 16:20 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36965 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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