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Explaining Success Rates at Providing Threshold Public Goods: An Approach Based on Impulse Balance Theory

Alberti, Federica and Cartwright, Edward and Stepanova, Anna (2013) Explaining Success Rates at Providing Threshold Public Goods: An Approach Based on Impulse Balance Theory. UNSPECIFIED. Social Science Rsearch Network 10.2139/ssrn.2309361. (doi:10.2139/ssrn.2309361) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:36874)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309361

Abstract

We propose and develop a model of behavior in threshold public good games. The model draws on learning direction theory and impulse balance theory. We find good support for the model and demonstrate that it can explain the success rates observed in threshold public good experiments. The model is applied in a variety of different settings: we compare games with a full refund to those with no refund, consider changes in relative endowment, and consider changes in the step return and net reward. Theoretically grounded hypotheses are distinctly lacking in the literature and so our approach offers a big step forward in understanding behavior in threshold public good games.

Item Type: Monograph (UNSPECIFIED)
DOI/Identification number: 10.2139/ssrn.2309361
Uncontrolled keywords: public good, threshold, learning direction theory, impulse balance theory, counterfactual thinking
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 12:26 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:36 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36874 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
Stepanova, Anna: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1965-842X
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