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Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs

Cartwright, Edward (2009) Conformity and out of equilibrium beliefs. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 70 (1-2). pp. 164-185. ISSN 0167-2681. (doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003

Abstract

We analyze a model of conformity with contrasting inferences. Given a form of ‘strong inferences’, any non-conforming agent is believed to have ‘extreme preferences’ and can expect to receive low esteem. With a weaker form of inferences, a non-conforming agent could be inferred to have ‘average preferences’ and can expect a smaller fall in esteem. We find that the type of inferences need not influence whether a conformist equilibrium exists. It will, however, impact on the size of the set of conformist equilibria and thus weakening inferences acts as an equilibrium selection device.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.003
Uncontrolled keywords: Conformity; Social norms; Out of equilibrium beliefs; Signalling
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 12:20 UTC
Last Modified: 01 Aug 2019 10:36 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36873 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Cartwright, Edward: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0194-9368
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