Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping in social groups

Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna (2014) Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping in social groups. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 16 (5). pp. 743-766. ISSN 1097-3923. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12078) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12078

Abstract

We argue that a social norm and the coordination of behavior within social groups can be expressed by a correlated equilibrium. Given a social group structure (a partition of individuals into social groups), we propose four conditions that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent with social norms. These are: (a) within-group anonymity (conformity within groups), (b) group independence (no conformity between groups), (c) homophily (individuals in the same group have similar attributes), and (d) predictable group behavior (ex-post stability). We demonstrate that correlated equilibrium satisfying (a)-(c) exist very generally and equilibrium satisfying (a)-(d) exist in games with many players. We also consider stereotyped beliefs - beliefs that all individuals in a social group can be expected to behave in the same way - and show that stereotyping is not costly to the person who stereotypes but may or may not be beneficial to society.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: correlated equilibrium, conformity, stereotyping, social groups, within-group fairness, homophily, social norms
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 11:57 UTC
Last Modified: 30 Jan 2015 07:15 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36868 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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