Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games

Gillet, Joris and Cartwright, Edward and Van Vugt, Mark (2011) Selfish or servant leadership? Evolutionary predictions on leadership personalities in coordination games. Personality and Individual Differences, 51 (3). pp. 231-236. ISSN 0191-8869. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.003

Abstract

We study the personalities of emergent leaders in two coordination games in groups of four players each with monetary incentives. Our results support the evolutionary hypothesis that leadership is a social good for the group: leadership benefits followers but is potentially costly for the individual taking on the leader role. Across the two economic games leaders do less well – earn less money – on average than followers. Furthermore, social participants choose to lead more often than selfish participants and there is no relationship between leadership behavior and personal dominance. Our results support the idea that leadership can be servant rather than selfish and we note the implications of this finding.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Leadership; Coordination; Evolution; Conflict; Personality
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 11:47 UTC
Last Modified: 14 May 2014 12:40 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36866 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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