Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs

Cartwright, Edward and Patel, Amrish (2010) Public Goods, Social Norms, and Naïve Beliefs. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12 (2). pp. 199-223. ISSN 1097-3923. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01457.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01457.x

Abstract

An individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper, we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naïve and biased toward taking things at “face value.” We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naïve inferences.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 11:43 UTC
Last Modified: 14 May 2014 12:41 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36865 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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