Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game

Cartwright, Edward and Patel, Amrish (2010) Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12 (4). pp. 691-708. ISSN 1097-3923. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01470.x) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01470.x

Abstract

Whether motivated by reciprocity or conformity, imitation is common in public good contexts. We consider the incentive for an agent to contribute to a public good if he expects imitation from others. Using a sequential public good game with exogenous ordering, we show that agents early enough in the sequence who believe imitation to be sufficiently likely would want to contribute. By contributing, they expect total contributions to increase significantly. We also show that preferences determine how early an agent need be, that the observed share of imitators in experiments is sufficiently high to warrant contribution and that an increase in group size reduces the incentive to contribute.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 23 Nov 2013 11:41 UTC
Last Modified: 14 May 2014 12:40 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36864 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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