Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets

Schleiter, Petra and Morgan-Jones, Edward (2009) Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets. American Political Science Review, 103 (3). pp. 496-512. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990062) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990062

Abstract

Some European constitutions give cabinets great discretion to manage their own demise, whereas others limit their choices and insert the head of state into decisions about government termination. In this article, we map the tremendous variation in the constitutional rules that govern cabinet termination and test existing expectations about its effects on a government's survival and mode of termination. In doing so, we use the most extensive government survival data set available to date, the first to include East and West European governments. Our results demonstrate that constitutional constraints on governments and presidential influence on cabinet termination are much more common than has previously been understood and have powerful effects on the hazard profiles of governments. These results alter and improve the discipline's understanding of government termination and durability, and have implications for comparative work in a range of areas, including the survival and performance of democracies, electoral accountability, opportunistic election calling, and political business cycles.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: Edward Morgan-Jones
Date Deposited: 14 Nov 2013 16:51 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Jun 2014 08:37 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/36437 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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