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Getting it Right

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Getting it Right. Philosophical Studies, 166 (2). pp. 329-347. ISSN 0031-8116. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:35954)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-01...

Abstract

Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of ‘‘getting it right.’’ The idea then developed is that accuracy is a genus with several species. Believing truly is a prominent species, but it is not the only one. Finally, it is argued that accuracy monism is equally good or better than both traditional truth monism and its main dialectical rival, value pluralism, when it comes to satisfying three important axiological desiderata.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 16:21 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:14 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35954 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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