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Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement. Philosophical Issues, 23 (N/A). pp. 276-296. ISSN 1758-2237. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:35952)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phis.12...

Abstract

There is something very appealing about the idea that we are epistemic agents. One reason—if not the main reason—is that, while we are undoubtedly fallible creatures, us being epistemic agents that do things means that it might just be within our power to improve and thereby do better. One important way in which we would want to improve is in relation to our well- established tendency for cognitive bias. Still, the proper role of epistemic agency in us avoiding or correcting for cognitive bias is highly limited. In fact, what we know from empirical psychology—particularly with respect to our tendencies for overconfidence—suggests that we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement, and have good reason to impose significant constraints on our ability to exercise such agency in ameliorative contexts.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 16:17 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:14 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35952 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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