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Meno and the Monist

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Meno and the Monist. Metaphilosophy, 44 (1-2). pp. 157-170. ISSN 0026-1068. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
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http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12...

Abstract

Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato’s Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny fully compatible with veritistic value monism. Consequently, contrary to what seems to be sup- posed in the literature, the critics of monism have little to gain from turning to the Meno for support.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: K. Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 16:12 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:14 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35948 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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