Skip to main content

Epistemic Perfectionism and Liberal Democracy

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer, Kelly, Jamie T. (2013) Epistemic Perfectionism and Liberal Democracy. Social Philosophy Today, 29 (N/A). pp. 49-58. ISSN 1543-4044. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:35946)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://www.pdcnet.org/socphiltoday/content/socphil...

Abstract

Robert Talisse’s recent attempt to justify liberal democracy in epistemic terms is in many ways a breath of fresh air. However, in the present paper we argue that his defense faces two inter-related problems. The first problem pertains to his defense of liberalism, and owes to the fact that a commitment to the folk-epistemological norms in terms of which he makes his case does not commit one to partaking in liberal institutions. Consequently, our (alleged) commitment to the relevant epistemic norms does not justify liberal democracy. The second problem pertains to his defense of democracy. The problem is that, if Talisse provides what we take to be the most plausible response to the first problem, framed in terms of his acceptance of a form of epistemic perfectionism, he is able to maintain his commitment to liberal institutions, but at the price of leaving democracy behind in favor of what we will refer to as a liberal epistocracy.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 16:04 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:14 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35946 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):