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Epistemology and Empirical Investigation

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2008) Epistemology and Empirical Investigation. Grazer Philosopische Studien, 76 (N/A). pp. 109-134. ISSN 0165-9227. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

Recently, Hilary Kornblith has argued that epistemological investigation is substantially empirical. In the present paper, I will first show that his claim is not contingent upon the further and, admittedly, controversial assumption that all objects of epistemological investigation are natural kinds. Then, I will argue that, contrary to what Kornblith seems to assume, this methodological contention does not imply that there is no need for attending to our epistemic concepts in epistemology. Understanding the make-up of our concepts and, in particular, the purposes they fill, is necessary for a proper acknowledgement of epistemology’s role in conceptual improvement.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: K. Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 15:54 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:14 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35939 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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