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Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence

Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke ISBN 978-0-230-34789-2. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:35936)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. Yet, we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to this problem lies in accepting a form of epistemic paternalism. Accepting such paternalism is to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without his or her consent but for his or her own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is quite often more.

Item Type: Book
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
Date Deposited: 01 Nov 2013 15:45 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:14 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35936 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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