Skip to main content

In defence of activities

Illari, Phyllis, Williamson, Jon (2013) In defence of activities. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 44 (1). pp. 69-83. ISSN 0925-4560. (doi:10.1007/s10838-013-9217-5) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10...

Abstract

In this paper, we examine what is to be said in defence of Machamer, Darden and Craver’s controversial dualism about activities and entities (MDC 2000). We explain why we believe the notion of an activity to be a novel, valuable one, and set about clearing away some initial objections that can lead to its being brushed aside unexamined. We argue that substantive debate about ontology can only be effective when desiderata for an ontology are explicitly articulated. We distinguish three such desiderata. The first is a more permissive descriptive ontology of science, the second a more reductive ontology prioritising understanding, and the third a more reductive ontology prioritising minimalism. We compare MDC’s entities-activities ontology to its closest rival, the entities-capacities ontology, and argue that the entities-activities ontology does better on all three desiderata

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1007/s10838-013-9217-5
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 13 Sep 2013 10:22 UTC
Last Modified: 29 May 2019 11:02 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/35195 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):