Williamson, Jon (2013) Why Frequentists and Bayesians Need Each Other. Erkenntnis, 78 (2). pp. 293-318. ISSN 1572-8420. (doi:10.1007/s10670-011-9317-8) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:33929)
The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. | |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9317-8 |
Abstract
The orthodox view in statistics has it that frequentism and Bayesianism
are diametrically opposed—two totally incompatible takes on the problem of statistical inference. This paper argues to the contrary that the two approaches are
complementary and need to mesh if probabilistic reasoning is to be carried out
correctly.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
DOI/Identification number: | 10.1007/s10670-011-9317-8 |
Subjects: |
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA273 Probabilities Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA276 Mathematical statistics |
Divisions: | Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages |
Depositing User: | Jon Williamson |
Date Deposited: | 20 May 2013 13:48 UTC |
Last Modified: | 16 Nov 2021 10:11 UTC |
Resource URI: | https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/33929 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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