Reid et al.'s distance bounding protocol and mafia fraud attacks over noisy channels

Mitrokotsa, Aikaterini and Dimitrakakis, Christos and Peris-Lopez, Pedro and Hernandez-Castro, Julio C. (2010) Reid et al.'s distance bounding protocol and mafia fraud attacks over noisy channels. IEEE Communications Letters, 14 (2). pp. 121-123. ISSN 1089-7798. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2010.02.091946) (Full text available)

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Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/LCOMM.2010.02.091946

Abstract

Distance bounding protocols are an effective countermeasure against relay attacks including distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud attacks. Reid et al. proposed the first symmetric key distance bounding protocol against mafia and terrorist fraud attacks [1]. However, [2] claims that this is only achieved with a (7/8) n probability of success for mafia fraud, rather than the theoretical value of (3/4) n (for n rounds) achieved by distance bounding protocols without a final signature. We prove that the mafia fraud attack success using the Reid et al. protocol is bounded by (3/4) n and reduces as noise increases. The proof can be of further interest as it is the first - to the best of our knowledge - detailed analysis of the effects of communication errors on the security of a distance bounding protocol.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled keywords:	Contactless smart cards; Distance bounding protocols; Mafia fraud attacks; Relay attacks; RFID
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA 75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Divisions:	Faculties > Sciences > School of Computing > Security Group
Depositing User:	Julio Hernandez-Castro
Date Deposited:	24 Oct 2012 12:55 UTC
Last Modified:	18 Mar 2013 15:00 UTC
Resource URI:	https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31946 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)