Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013) Moderate Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophical Studies, 163 (2). pp. 337-357. ISSN 0031-8116. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)
The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderate epistemic expressivism—holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a more radical form of epistemic expressivism, as well as two further arguments, framed in terms of the two most promising attempts to ground claims about epistemic value in something other than commitments to particular conceptions of inquiry. While this does not establish that moderate epistemic expressivism is true, its ability to explain a significant but puzzling axiological datum, as well as withstand strong counterarguments, makes clear that it is a theory to be reckoned with.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy|
|Depositing User:||Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij|
|Date Deposited:||28 Sep 2012 14:14|
|Last Modified:||08 Jul 2014 11:17|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31060 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|