Relational Holism and Humean Supervenience

Darby, George (2012) Relational Holism and Humean Supervenience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 63 (4). pp. 773-788. ISSN 0007-0882. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr049

Abstract

It has been widely noted that Humean supervenience, according to which everything supervenes on intrinsic properties of point-sized things and the spatiotemporal relations between them, is at odds with the nonlocal character of quantum mechanics, according to which not everything supervenes on intrinsic properties of point-sized things and the spatiotemporal relations between them. In particular, a standard view is that the parts of a composite quantum system instantiate further relations which are not accounted for in Lewis's Humean mosaic. But that suggests a simple solution: Why couldn't Lewis simply add these new relations to the supervenience basis? The aim of this article is to use Humean supervenience as a foil to spell out a feature of entanglement of general metaphysical interest: The way in which the metaphysical lessons drawn for two-party systems ramify when systems of many parties are considered. The main conclusion is that the proposed simple fix in fact results in a supervenience thesis different in kind from Lewis's, by making the relations in the supervenience basis global in a certain sense.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Fiona Godfrey
Date Deposited: 28 Sep 2012 13:40
Last Modified: 14 Apr 2014 15:40
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31054 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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