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Particularism and Default Valency

Kirchin, Simon T. (2007) Particularism and Default Valency. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4 (1). pp. 16-32. ISSN 1740-4681. (doi:10.1177/1740468106072780)


In this paper, which draws on some of the distinctions I made and thoughts I gave in my 'Moral Particularism: An Introduction', elsewhere in the volume of JMP, I concentrate on the notion of default valency. In §1 I outline a recent debate that shows why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves, although I do not give a detailed defence of its legitimacy. In §2 I use this notion to comment on how anyone, but particularly particularists, might distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not to argue for a specific way of dividing such features into types but to present various taxonomical options.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1177/1740468106072780
Uncontrolled keywords: ethics • features • generalism • particularism • valency
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Simon Kirchin
Date Deposited: 13 May 2008 09:19 UTC
Last Modified: 28 May 2019 13:38 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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