When just-world beliefs promote and when they inhibit forgiveness

Strelan, Peter and Sutton, Robbie M. (2011) When just-world beliefs promote and when they inhibit forgiveness. Personality and Individual Differences, 50 (2). pp. 163-168. ISSN 0191-8869. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.09.019

Abstract

The present study provides further evidence that justice and forgiveness are not necessarily competitive responses. Among 157 undergraduates instructed to recall either serious or benign transgressions, just-world beliefs for the self (BJW-self) was associated with forgiveness as inhibition of negative responding but not forgiveness as positive responding. Each of these relations was significantly moderated by transgression severity: the more benign the transgression, the stronger the relationship. Just-world beliefs for others (BJW-others) was negatively associated with inhibition of negative responding and unrelated to positive responding. These relations held over and above well-established predictors of transgression-specific forgiveness (relationship closeness and post-transgression offender effort), and an individual difference variable, justice sensitivity. In practical terms, BJW-self may enable people to better deal with minor stressors. An important theoretical implication is that modelling the relationship between just-world beliefs and forgiveness requires a bidimensional conception of both constructs.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: Robbie Sutton
Date Deposited: 13 Dec 2010 14:29
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2014 08:43
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/26146 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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