Tian, Ye and Breheny, Richard and Ferguson, Heather J. (2010) Why we stimulate negated information: A dynamic pragmatic account. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63 (12). pp. 2305-2312. ISSN 1747-0218. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2010.525712) (Full text available)
A well-established finding in the simulation literature is that participants simulate the positive argument of negation soon after reading a negative sentence, prior to simulating a scene consistent with the negated sentence (Kaup, Lu¨dtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, & Lu¨dtke, 2007). One interpretation of this finding is that negation requires two steps to process: first represent what is being negated then “reject” that in favour of a representation of a negation-consistent state of affairs (Kaup et al., 2007). In this paper we argue that this finding with negative sentences could be a byproduct of the dynamic way that language is interpreted relative to a common ground and not the way that negation is represented. We present a study based on Kaup et al. (2007) that tests the competing accounts. Our results suggest that some negative sentences are not processed in two steps, but provide support for the alternative, dynamic account.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Psychology > Cognitive Psychology|
|Depositing User:||Heather Ferguson|
|Date Deposited:||09 Dec 2010 10:44 UTC|
|Last Modified:||06 Jun 2014 14:31 UTC|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/26122 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|