Russo, Frederica and Williamson, Jon (2007) Interpreting Causality in the Health Sciences. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 21 (2). pp. 157-170. ISSN 0269-8595. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)
We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms, or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single concept of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the *epistemic* theory of causality provides the required unification.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Jon Williamson|
|Date Deposited:||27 Mar 2008 14:38|
|Last Modified:||19 Jun 2015 15:50|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/2510 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|