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Wealth alone does not buy health: Political capacity, democracy, and the spread of AIDS

Gizelis, Theodora-Ismene (2009) Wealth alone does not buy health: Political capacity, democracy, and the spread of AIDS. Political Geography, 28 (2). pp. 121-131. ISSN 0962-6298. (doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.01.005) (Access to this publication is currently restricted. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:20347)

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Abstract

Although there have been have numerous studies on AIDS documenting its mortality, its epidemiological

features, and its relationship to poverty and development, few studies have systematically analyzed how

political factors and policies may help curtail the spread of AIDS. In this paper I consider how a variety of

domestic factors influence HIV infection rates across countries. I argue that states with higher state

capacity are better able to reduce the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Moreover, I argue that while

strong autocracies can implement efficient policies with fewer constraints, democracies tend to be more

responsive to the needs of the population and can be more efficient in curtailing the spread of HIV/AIDS.

I empirically evaluate the hypotheses using a cross-sectional time-series sample of 117 countries. The

empirical results indicate that greater state capacity indeed appears to help curtail HIV/AIDS infection

rates.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.01.005
Uncontrolled keywords: State capacity; HIV/AIDS; Communicable diseases; Political regime; Contagion effects
Subjects: J Political Science
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: Ismene Gizelis
Date Deposited: 11 Nov 2009 14:33 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:58 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/20347 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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