Majority-consistent preference orderings

Craven, John (1996) Majority-consistent preference orderings. Social Choice and Welfare, 13 (3). pp. 259-267. ISSN 0176-1714. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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This paper considers the construction of sets of preferences that give consistent outcomes under majority voting. Fishburn [7] shows that by combining the concepts of single-Peaked and single-troughed preferences (which are themselves examples of value restriction) it is possible to provide a simple description of the extent of agreement between individuals that allows the construction of sets that are as large as those previously known (for fewer than 7 alternatives) and larger than those previously known (for 7 or more alternatives). This paper gives a characterisation of the preferences generated through these agreements and makes observations on the relation between the sizes of such sets as the number of alternatives increases.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: M.A. Ziai
Date Deposited: 07 Sep 2009 12:12
Last Modified: 30 Jun 2014 13:06
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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