Motha, Stewart (1998) Mabo: Encountering the Epistemic Limit of the Recognition ‘Difference'. Griffith Law Review, 7 (1). pp. 79-96. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)
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This article contends that while the recognition of difference is an essential precursor to justice for Aboriginal people, it was not accomplished in the High Court's decision in Mabo, which is more appropriately characterised as a recognition of 'sameness'. Law's capacity to address justice depends on the possibility of recognising and understanding the particularity of the claimant; yet current modes of recognising difference have their origins in a liberal humanism and construction of knowledge which loses specificity and difference. The article proceeds through an initial discussion of the non-recognition of difference in Mabo, through an assessment of commentary since the judgment, and onto an examination of the limitations of current modes of understanding 'the other' and an exploration of ways of overcoming those limitations.
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > Kent Law School|
|Depositing User:||A. Davies|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 19:17 UTC|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2010 14:04 UTC|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1867 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|