Ellis, Christopher J. and Holden, Steinar (1997) Optimal contract length in a reputational model of monetary policy. European Economic Review, 41 (2). pp. 227-243. ISSN 0014-2921. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)
|The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided. (Contact us about this Publication)|
We develop a reputational model of monetary policy with endogenous contract length. In choosing contract length private sector agents trade off recontracting costs against the expected costs resulting from trading under contracts based on incorrect inflation expectations. However, due to an externality, the private and socially optimal contract lengths differ. When selecting individual contract length private agents do not consider the effect of contract length on the surprise inflation/output trade-off. In a reputational model of monetary policy this results in an excessive equilibrium inflation rate. The socially optimal outcome may be achieved by public policies that reduce recontracting costs.
|Uncontrolled keywords:||monetary policy; credibility; contract length|
|Depositing User:||T. Nasir|
|Date Deposited:||22 Oct 2009 14:03 UTC|
|Last Modified:||16 Jun 2014 13:20 UTC|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/18418 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|