Bargaining, efficiency wages, and the price-cost markup

Sanfey, Peter (1998) Bargaining, efficiency wages, and the price-cost markup. Economics Letters, 58 (2). pp. 193-197. ISSN 0165-1765. (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(97)00271-1

Abstract

The size of the negative effect of unions on the price-cost markup in efficient bargain models depends on the extent to which the union cares about employment rather than wages. A negative effect in labour demand models can also arise under efficiency wages.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: bargaining power; efficiency wages; markup
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Tara Puri
Date Deposited: 04 Jul 2009 00:15
Last Modified: 17 Jul 2014 11:42
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/17099 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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