Sheldon, Sally (2004) Gender Equality and Reproductive Decision Making. Feminist Legal Studies, 12 (3). pp. 303-316. ISSN 0966-3622. (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10691-004-4988-z) (Full text available)
In Evans, both the U.K. High Court and Court of Appeal upheld Howard Johnston’s right to refuse Natallie Evans access to the stored embryos which represented her only hope of having a child which was genetically her own. In this note, I focus on claims of gender (in)equality in the resolution of Evans. My argument is that such claims are often made all too easily, without full consideration of the problems of advancing them in the context of procreative decision-making, where men and women are inevitably differently situated. I conclude that although equality arguments are not wholly without value in this context, they need be used with extreme care. And, with due caution, I set out an equality argument of my own which was not made in Evans.
|Additional information:||The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > Kent Law School|
|Depositing User:||A. Davies|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:57 UTC|
|Last Modified:||05 Sep 2011 23:23 UTC|
|Resource URI:||https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1451 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|