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Does a functioning mind need a functioning body?

Johnson, Colin G. (2005) Does a functioning mind need a functioning body? In: Davis, Darryl N., ed. Visions of Mind. Idea Group Publishing, pp. 307-321. ISBN 1-59140-483-5. (KAR id:14379)

Language: English
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In recent years, the idea that somatic processes are intimately involved in actions traditionally considered to be purely mental has come to the fore. In particular, these arguments have revolved around the concept of somatic markers, i.e., bodily states that are generated by mind and then reperceived and acted upon. This chapter considers the somatic marker hypothesis and related ideas from the point of view of postclassical computation, i.e., the view that computing can be seen as a property of things-in-the-world rather than of an abstract class of mathematical machines. From this perspective, a number of ideas are discussed: the idea of somatic markers extending into the environment, an analogy with hardware interlocks in complex computer driven systems, and connections with the idea of just-do-it computation.

Item Type: Book section
Uncontrolled keywords: cognitive science, somatic markers, mind-body interactions
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA 76 Software, computer programming,
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Computing, Engineering and Mathematical Sciences > School of Computing
Depositing User: Mark Wheadon
Date Deposited: 24 Nov 2008 18:03 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:52 UTC
Resource URI: (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
Johnson, Colin G.:
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